CVE-2026-97603
Błąd w jądrze Linuxa pozwala na użycie zwolnionej pamięci, co prowadzi do nieprzewidywalnych skutków.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: idpf: disable DIM work before freeing q_vectors idpf never drains the Tx/Rx DIM works before freeing the memory they live in. tx_dim and rx_dim are embedded in struct idpf_q_vector, they are queued from the NAPI poll via net_dim(), and idpf_vport_intr_rel() ends with kfree(rsrc->q_vectors). Nothing in the driver cancels them. idpf_tx_dim_work() and idpf_rx_dim_work() then run on freed memory: idpf_vport_intr_write_itr() writes the ITR register through q_vector->intr_reg.tx_itr / rx_itr, void __iomem pointers loaded out of the freed q_vector. No configuration is needed to get there -- IDPF_ITR_IS_DYNAMIC() is defined as (itr_mode) and idpf_vport_alloc() initialises both modes to IDPF_ITR_DYNAMIC. Draining after idpf_vport_intr_napi_dis_all() is not enough on its own. idpf_net_dim() is called from inside the "if (napi_complete_done(napi, work_done))" branch of the poll, and napi_complete_done() has already cleared NAPIF_STATE_SCHED by then. napi_disable_locked() waits only while (val & (NAPIF_STATE_SCHED | NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC)), so napi_disable() can return while the poll tail is still queueing the work, and a plain cancel_work_sync() would be re-armed behind the drain. Use disable_work_sync(): schedule_work() on a work with a non-zero disable count is dropped by clear_pending_if_disabled() before __queue_work() is reached. Move idpf_init_dim() to idpf_vport_intr_alloc() so the works are initialised on every path that can reach the drain -- the three "goto intr_deinit" sites between idpf_vport_intr_init() and idpf_vport_intr_ena() get there without the enable side having run. Nothing re-enables them: rsrc->q_vectors is freed on every exit from idpf_vport_open() and on every idpf_vport_stop(), so the count dies with the object. It is a race, not a deterministic failure -- net_dim() only schedules once DIM_NEVENTS events have accumulated and the profile index changes. A KASAN ifup/ifdown loop under load is the way to see it.
| Źródło | Wartość |
|---|---|
| NVD – CVSS | 0.0 |
| CISA KEV (aktywnie wykorzystywane) | Nie |
| FIRST EPSS (prawdopodobieństwo exploita) | 0.2% |
| Opublikowano (NVD) | 2026-09-25 11:17:13 UTC |
| Ostatnia modyfikacja (NVD) | 2026-10-03 11:18:06 UTC |
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d64d4c6bb6bb63b6cdb7de133c3ec48333b27b5 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7dd4c829bac2916be98a3e34b41daaba7f42b4c4 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e4312953788244d47074987d40d76702cf929f1 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd7a1598645b6917a8676b7e2efe8d97ce68a952 (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67)